In the late 1970s, without divine intervention, the idea of ​​passing a Groundwater Act seemed hopeless. Urban, agricultural and mining stakeholders fought over who should control groundwater rights and there was no room for compromise.

Decades of efforts in the Arizona legislature to pass laws restricting groundwater pumping yielded nothing. The State Board of Groundwater Review, established in 1978, made legislative recommendations and held public hearings, but failed to pass Congress. This was at least in part due to opposition from the agricultural industry, which, as it does today, used the majority of Arizona’s pumped groundwater.

But in June 1980, the unbelievable became a reality.

government at the time. Democrat Bruce Babbitt signed the Arizona Groundwater Management Act. The Tucson, Phoenix, and Prescott metropolitan areas were required for the first time to reach “safe yields,” a catchphrase for balancing pumping and aquifer replenishment, by 2025. Including Nogales achieved the same goal in 1990.

This law created the Arizona Department of Water Resources and empowered it to impose water conservation requirements on farms, cities, and industries alike. To stem the land fraud rampant in Arizona in the 1960s and 1970s, the law requires all new subdivisions in the Tucson and Phoenix areas to be guaranteed a 100-year supply of water prior to sale. also obliged. a lot.

Six years later, the Ford Foundation named the law one of the 10 most innovative state and local programs in the United States.

It was part of stealth negotiations between Babbitt and the U.S. Department of the Interior. And it was part of closed-door negotiations between all major water players that worked in violation of all norms of democratic processes and transparency.

In 2016, Babbitt gave a brief account in an interview published online with Doug Machan, communications manager for the Arizona Department of Water Resources. It’s here:ADWR: What was the main motivation for passing this law? Was it mostly urban and overly reliant on groundwater extraction?

babbitt: Sometimes things have to go wrong before people can really come together, making it almost impossible to do anything more.

Groundwater problems have been getting worse over the last 30-40 years. I was getting to the point where things were going to happen. Most notably, state courts have banned the transportation of water to mines. I think the city representatives were starting to see that. their future was affected.

The Department of the Interior was concerned about the Central Arizona project because the (CAP) law contained language that the state committed to control overdraft of groundwater. All those forces came together.

The entire structure was ready to collapse.And sometimes that kind of disaster finally motivates people to do things they probably should have done sooner. But the table was set when I took over those negotiations

ADWR: Legal lore is that it was an unprecedented bipartisan bargain. Is it safe to say that the Fed played a role by leveraging his CAP?

Babbitt: Yes Yes. We negotiated behind closed doors outside of Congress, and I think it’s been more than a year. I have been fortunate to have great legislative leadership in the presence of Senate Minority Alfredo Gutierrez. ) allies. Really, really great leader.

The Home Office was behind the first 90-95% of the negotiations. But when I hit a dead end, I reached out to Cecil Andrus, who was his secretary at the time, and told me that I needed to get the Ministry of the Interior ready and into the game, and I made a deal with him.

I said “Cec, you have to threaten to cancel the Central Arizona project to motivate people.” And I said, “Of course I never asked you to do that. And I condemn you for controlling federal intervention.”

But it worked. He came to Arizona (in late 1979) to read about rioting and motivate people so he could get over the final 10 yards.

ADWR: That’s great in baseball. But how did Democratic governors get conservative Republicans to accept this?

Babbitt: Now, remember Congress has failed time and time again over the past decade. They couldn’t really do anything.

At that point, the leadership agreed that we would take highly unusual steps, exclude us completely from the legislative process, and initiate behind-the-scenes negotiations with interest groups such as mines, cities, and agriculture. Congress basically reported to the Republican leadership that we were making progress, except for the participation of Stan Turley, so stay away from it.

And amazingly, after drafting hundreds of pages of legislation, I called a special session of Congress. June of that year. The bill was introduced and passed in one day with no amendments or virtually no debate.

Now, those who worry about process, public meetings, and transparency will say that there is little way to pass laws. But the times demanded it. It was a matter of urgency. And in the context of what had to be done, members of the legislature stepped aside. And we made it.